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From Bits to Atoms: Does the Open Source Software Model
Translate to Open Source Hardware?
By Dana Beldiman*
Many believe that open source innovation works “faster, better
and cheaper” than conventional, proprietary innovation. The success
of open source innovation has been seen primarily in open source
software (OSS), whose output is an intangible, digital product (bits).
This paper asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an
open source hardware (OSH) environment, which involves tangible
products (atoms). Specifically, it considers whether the tangible
nature of OSH products presents legal or practical obstacles to their
successful commercial implementation, in an environment where no
appropriable IP rights exist. To answer these questions, the paper
follows the innovation knowledge flow generated by an OSH
invention and examines the legal structure and enforceability of open
hardware license. It further considers in what way the absence of IP
rights impacts the choice of a business model for OSH.
Review of OSS business models indicate that, despite the nonappropriability of IP, software products are being produced through
a wide range of models, from pure open source, to hybrid operations,
driven by large commercial firms. Hardware presents a more difficult
business case than software, because the output of OSH is a tangible
product. Implementation of the invention into an end-product requires
materials, manufacturing, labor, distribution, etc., all of which are
cost-intensive and require capital investment. Nonetheless, a few
OSH initiatives successfully run self-funded or non-profit-funded
operations, even absent exclusive IP rights. However, given the costs
associated with producing a tangible product, future business models
are more likely to be a hybrid between open source community and a
23
*Dr. Dana Beldiman is a professor of law and teaches IP law at UC
Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, USA and at Bucerius
Law School, Hamburg, Germany. Ms. Beldiman is the Founder and
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received legal education in both the US and Germany. In addition to
her academic activities, she is a partner with the San Francisco office
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commercial operator. Still, such operations would rely heavily on
innovative input from the open source community.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Many believe that open source innovation works “faster, better
and cheaper” than conventional, proprietary innovation. The success
of open source innovation has been seen primarily in open source
software (OSS), whose output is an intangible, digital product (bits).
This paper asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an
open source hardware (OSH) environment, where the output is a
tangible product (atoms). Specifically, it considers whether the
tangible nature of OSH products presents legal or practical obstacles
to their successful commercial implementation.
Open source community innovation has been extremely
successful due to the number of contributors and the speed of
innovation. It brings together large numbers of individuals who
collaborate and use their minds in solving specific problems. This
innovation process tends to occur at higher speeds and generate better
performance than most proprietary innovation.
During its relatively short existence, open source community
innovation has grown from software to other information products,
such as Wikipedia, video journalism, and open science. More recently
it has expanded beyond pure information products into the realm of
tangibles. “Open source hardware” (OSH) uses the same innovation
mechanism as OSS, but its final product is a physical threedimensional artifact. Products of the OSH process include electronic
devices, medical prosthetics, diagnostic equipment, musical
equipment, power supply, lab equipment, toys and games,1 etc.
Because of its fairly incipient state of development, OSH
presents the researcher with a fertile petri dish of unsolved questions
at the intersection of law, economics, business, and sociology, which
raise cross-disciplinary issues, such as appropriability of knowledge,
ability to capture value absent IP rights and the relation between an
inventive open community and a commercial operator.2

1

LOCAL MOTORS, https://localmotors.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (vehicles); OPEN SOURCE
ECOLOGY, https://www.opensourceecology.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (agricultural
implements); ALEPH OBJECTS, INC. 3D PRINTER https://www.alephobjects.com/ (3D printers);
ARDUINO, https://www.arduino.cc/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (circuit boards).
2
This article provides a “horizontal” overview over the implications of the tangible nature of the
OSH product. The numerous legal issues surrounding OSH have been merely hinted on.
Further in-depth “vertical” work remains to be done on these issues, to shed light on a variety of
innovation-related topics, such as the role of knowledge in innovation, the flow of knowledge
between inventor and implementer, managing the inventor community to generate a sustainable
stream of innovation, the roles of IP rights and of latent community knowledge, or legal aspects
of the OSH license enforceability, in particular relating to 3D printed products. A scholarly
perspective on these issues may help validate the OSH industry and stimulate its development.
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This paper is intended as an overview over the OSH process,
highlighting legal and business aspects in an open community
environment, specifically focusing on OSH and the tangible nature of
its output. It is structured in three general parts. We first compare
OSH to OSS in terms of the knowledge flow 3 enabled by the open
innovation mechanism. Next, we consider the legal structure of the
open licenses and assess the enforceability of the OSH license
compared to the OSH license. The final part discusses the tangible
nature of the OSH product, compared to the intangible output of OSS.
It inquires to what extent the cost associated with producing a
tangible product, combined with the absence of appropriable IP
rights, may detract from the commercial implementability of OSH
inventions.
The strength of open communities, whether OSS or OSH, lies in
their flow of knowledge: early, repeated disclosures of knowledge,
lead to its wide diffusion and reuse by a potentially large number of
downstream community members and gives rise to an overall
enhanced innovation power. However, the trade-off for this wide
diffusion of knowledge is a reduction in the incentive to invest. This
may make the final (commercial) implementation of the product
problematic. We next consider the structure of the OSH license,
whose function it is to formalize the diffusion of knowledge that
occurs at the creative level, into an allocation of IP rights. We note
that the tangible nature of the OSH output prompts a slightly different
license structure compared to the OSS license. Its enforceability
therefore raises some questions. Finally, we compare the paths toward
implementation of the final product. This area presents the greatest
difference between OSH and OSS. While software is self-executing,
the instructions for its implementation are incorporated into the code
and running the program is all that is required, hardware must be
built. This involves materials, manufacturing, labor, etc., all of which
are cost-intensive and demand capital investment. In general, capital
investment requires appropriable IP rights, however such rights are
not available under the open source license.
Nonetheless, in the OSH community, inventors have started
productizing their inventions, without the benefit of outside
investment. These initiatives appear to be successful to some extent,
even absent exclusive IP rights, as they derive some competitive
This paper will take a “knowledge-centric” approach. The term “knowledge” has been
borrowed from economic literature to broadly denote information resources of any type,
including data, code, scientific formulas, test results, designs, know-how, text, etc.
3
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advantage from the latent knowledge that resides within the
community. However, because of the cost associated with production
of a tangible good, OSH operations may only be able to scale if
outside funding by a commercial entity is available. A hybrid model
that combines an open community with a commercial operator would
continue to heavily rely on the community as a source of continuing
innovation. At the same time, a misalignment in ethos and values
exists between the open source community and the commercial
operator. To ensure the continued flow of innovation, the relationship
between the two groups must be managed with skill in order not to
destabilize the community.
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION
A. Background of collaborative (open source) innovation
Collaborative innovation4, based on early cumulative disclosure
of non-appropriated innovation, has been extensively described in
scholarly literature.5
The earliest and most prominent example of such innovation is
Open Source Software (OSS). OSS’s emergence has been enabled by
the digitized network environment. Because of low communication
costs, the collaboration on shared innovation projects has become
possible among geographically dispersed individuals. They form
communities, most often of users, for purposes of common problemsolving projects and contribute time, knowledge and skill, generally,
for free.6 Participants join based on a combination of intrinsic nonmonetary motivations, such as the desire to exercise creativity, the
desire to overcome a challenge, the sense of achievement having
solved a problem, identification with a particular group or altruism.7
4

Various forms of collaborative innovation are referred to as peer production, user innovation,
open (source) innovation or co-creation, respectively. The form at issue here is characterized by
the fact that the rights to any knowledge generated are diffused, rather than concentrated in the
form of IP rights. It must also be differentiated from some forms of open innovation, which is
co-created by multiple creators across firm boundaries, is intended to lead to the acquisition of
proprietary rights.
5
Yochai Benkler, Law, Innovation and Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (2017); Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, “Open” disclosure
of innovations, incentives and follow-on reuse: Theory on processes of cumulative innovation
and a field experiment in computational biology, ELSEVIER, RES. POL’Y, (2015).
6
Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 139
(2011).
7
Margit Osterloh, Sandra Rota & Bernhard Kuster, Open-Source-Softwareproduktion: Ein
neues Innovationsmodell? (2004),
http://www.opensourcejahrbuch.de/download/jb2004/chapter_02/II-4-OserlohRotaKuster.pdf;
Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding
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Community members are self-selected based on their abilities
relevant to the project; they vet, test and evaluate the quality of the
solutions proposed by others.8
Innovation in this context is the result of a process, in which
knowledge generated upstream is built upon, recombined and
cumulated to provide innovation for new products and applications,
or for improvements of existing ones.9 Because OSS communities
adhere to an ethos of non-appropriation, all knowledge generated is
shared with the community.10
The overall strength of the OSS approach lies in the number of
contributors and the speed of innovation. Its mechanism is based on
collaboration by a potentially vast number of contributors’
“eyeballs”,11 with unrestricted access to the entire body of innovation
developed upstream relating to the project.12 This innovation process
tends to occur at higher speeds and generate better performance than
most proprietary innovation.13
B. Open Hardware and its evolution
OSH constitutes a new frontier, in which the open innovation
mechanism moves beyond pure information products, into the realm
of tangibles14. In recent years, technology has made considerable
strides by developing the ability to digitally manipulate physical
objects. A material object casts an “information shadow.”15 It can
therefore be digitally created, represented, modified and transformed
with the same relative ease as software goods.16 When it comes to
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1-27 (J. Feller et al. eds., MIT Press 2005).
8
Benkler, supra note 5, at 236.
9
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 9.
10
Richard Stallman, The GNU Manifesto (1985), https://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html.
11
ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999).
12
Benkler, supra note 5, at 9; Dana Beldiman & Fabian Flüchter, Navigating Patents in an
Open Hardware Environment, in CO-CREATION - RESHAPING BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN THE
ERA OF BOTTOM-UP ECONOMICS 1, 163 (M. Moritz & T. Redlich eds., Springer Verlag, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
13
Benkler, supra note 5, at 232.
14
Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture of Participation: Does Code
Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source Development Model?, 56 MGMT. SCI.
1116, 1119-21 (2006); Bourdreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7-8.
15
Karim Lakhani, Hila Lifshitz-Assaf & Michael Tushman, Open Innovation and
Organizational Boundaries; Task Decomposition, Knowledge Distribution and the Locus of
Innovation, HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATION ECONOMIC AND
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 355, 357 (Anna Grandori ed, Edward Elgar Publishing 2013).
16
Lakhani et. al., supra note 15, at 357.
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transposing it into actual physical three-dimensional objects, practical
as well as conceptual complications arise, as will be discussed in
further detail below.
Open Hardware is in many ways the hardware equivalent of
“open software”. It is based on the same creative mechanism as OSS
and is predicated on the same motivations and ideology to generate an
open and accessible flow of knowledge. The difference lies in the
“product”. Unlike OSS, where the product is the source code, the
OSH product is a physical artifact, electrical, mechanical or
otherwise, as well as the knowledge embodied into it.17 This fact has
implications with respect to the structure of the open license
agreement, and with respect to contributors’ ability to finalize the
inventive process by manufacturing and commercializing its output.
The OSH movement began with electronics hardware and
initially gained popularity mostly within the amateur community. For
reasons of cost and availability of equipment, initially many of its
products were one-time hand-manufactured “hacks”. The movement
has now progressed beyond pure amateur use.18 However, the number
of OSH projects placed on Github and Thingiverse is steadily
increasing. A data acquisition campaign for the period 2016-2017
conducted by Bonvoisin and others shows OSH production of
machine tools, vehicles, robotics, agriculture, medical prosthetics,
diagnostic equipment, musical equipment, power supply, lab
equipment, toys and games.19 Open hardware inventors have formed
an umbrella association, the Open Source Hardware Association
(OSHWA)20, which represents the “voice” of the open hardware
community, tasked with advocating, educating and uniting
stewardship of the open source hardware movement.21
Still, the scale of OSH projects remains relatively modest
compared to OSS. Several reasons may account for this. First, is the
lack of sophistication of available technology. Many OSH projects
are implemented in the electronics field, often by manually
assembling existing components. The scalability of this technique is
limited. However, OSH has seen a considerable boost through the
advent of the technology of additive manufacturing or 3D printing. 22
17

John R. Ackermann, Toward Open Source Hardware, 34 U. Dayton L. Rev. 183, 216 (2009).
ALICIA GIBB, BUILDING OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE (Addison Wesley ed., 2015.
19
J. Bonvoisin et al., What is the “Source” of Open Source Hardware? J. OPEN HARDWARE.,
2017, at 1, 5-6; http://doi.org/10.5334/joh.7
20
OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE ASSOCIATION, https://www.oshwa.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
21
Gibb, supra note 18, at xii.
22
Stefan Bechtold, 3D printing and the intellectual property system, Research Working Paper No. 28, in
ECON.
&
STAT.
SERIES
(World
Intellectual
Property
Organization
2015),
18
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This technology is still evolving. In the future, 3D printing is
expected to bring cost efficiencies, initially in the form of easy and
rapid prototyping, and in the longer perspective, by becoming a
principal, large-scale fabrication mode.23 Second, developing and
manufacturing three-dimensional objects is capital-intensive and the
path towards funding is not quite clear. Given an environment which
does not allow for appropriation of knowledge, on the one hand, and
the inchoate state of the technology, on the other, models for
capturing the economic value of OSH inventions remain to be
developed. The tangible nature of OSH output is likely to complicate
matters, as will be explained in detail below. Clearer business models
will attract the interest of potential funding sources and scholarly
literature can contribute in this regard.
We will now turn to the mechanism that drives open community
innovation, which underlies both OSS and OSH. Much of the
scholarship in this regard derives from the OSS space and will
constitute the primary source of the following discussion.
II. THE OPEN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION METHOD – IS OPEN
COMMUNITY INNOVATION “FASTER, BETTER,
CHEAPER”?
Many have puzzled over the growth and sustainability of OSS.
Economic theory is clear that when knowledge is freely shared within
a community and not appropriated, it reduces an inventor’s ability to
contract and, as a consequence, its ability to secure a proper reward
for the inventive work. This in turn depresses the incentive to
invent.24
Development of OSS places this premise in question. The Linux
environment, possibly the most successful OSS product, currently
runs on more than 82% of the world’s smart phones and 92% of the
world’s supercomputers, while Apache, an open source web-server
framework, supports about 67% of the web-servers in the world.25

http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_econstat_wp_28.pdf.
23
Eli Greenbaum, Three-Dimensional Printing and Open Source Hardware, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 257, 259, (2013).
24
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7-8; Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1755 (2010); Amy Kapczynski, Order without Intellectual
Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1796 (2017)
25
Joshua M. Pearce, Emerging Business Models for Open Source Hardware, J. OPEN
HARDWARE 1, 1 (2017) https://openhardware.metajnl.com/articles/10.5334/joh.4/; See also
Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 155-63; ZHUOXUAN LI, ET AL., WHY OPEN SOURCE,
EXPLORING THE MOTIVATIONS OF USING AN OPEN MODEL FOR HARDWARE, CONFERENCE
PAPER DETC 1, 2 (2017), www.researchgate.net/publication/316884384.
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Blockchain, one of the most promising new developments, runs on
OSS software.26 In large companies, open source software has
become the de facto default standard when it comes to software
selection decisions. The open model of knowledge production has
come to increasingly supplement and even displace incumbent closed
ones.27 OSS has come to play a more significant role “than was
theoretically admissible by economic models of motivation and
organization prevailing at the turn of the millennium.
A unique dynamic underlies open source knowledge production:
contributors participate in problem-solving communities, motivated
by a range of pro-social and personal, but generally non-monetary
considerations. 28 These motivations socialize community members to
engage in collaborative, rather than competitive interaction and to
share knowledge, rather than to appropriate it.29 The ethos of
collaboration, in turn, spawns a pattern of communication among
contributors that consists of frequent, freely shared updates,
comments and feedback. A rapid cycle of innovative activity finding, testing, and adopting or discarding solutions - is thus
stimulated, in which contributors consume and reuse information on
an ongoing basis. This process gives rise to considerable speed in
finding solutions and to a great diversity of approaches. 30
This dynamic seems attributable, primarily to two ingredients:
one is the knowledge production mechanism, characterized by early
disclosure of upstream information and second, the contributors’
motivation.31 Each will be discussed individually below.
A. Production of Knowledge
1. The anatomy of open inventive activity
Open inventive activity can be conceptualized as a series of
problems which are solved by making a large number of interacting
decisions. Any given set of parameters of a project will be satisfied by
multiple solutions. The initial task is to identify which approach best

HYPERLEDGER – OPEN SOURCE BLOCKCHAIN FOR BUSINESSES – IBM BLOCKCHAIN,
www.ibm.com/blockchain/hyperledger.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
27
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 6; Eric von Hippel, Susumu Ogawa and Jeroen P.J. de
Jong, The Age of the Consumer-Innovator, MIT SLOANE MAG. 27, 29-30 Fall 2011.
28
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 11-12.
29
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 8.
30
This dynamic is further associated with the absence of a hierarchical structure and full
autonomy of the contributors.
31
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7.
26
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meets the parameters given, in terms of functionality, size, and cost.32
For instance, if the goal is to construct a sustainable building by
capturing a certain quantity of rainwater, the question arises whether
rainwater will best be captured through roof structures, window
structures or otherwise. Once the approach has been found, say a roof
structure has been decided upon, a researcher will look for optimal
solutions within that given approach.33 For instance, it will have to be
decided whether a concave or a convex rooftop would be preferable.
Any given decision in this process is made in an environment of
uncertainty. To gain certainty, the decision is preceded by a series of
trial and error experiments, which provides the researcher with better
insight. Initially, these experiments are based on the inventor’s own
stock of knowledge. Subsequently, they are influenced by a
combination of outside factors, heuristics, theoretical understandings,
analogies, as well as activities and experiments of others. This
process is informed by a steady stream of communications between
the researcher and the community in the form of mutual intermediate
disclosures: updates by the researcher and observation and feedback
by others.34
2. Disclosure
It has been posited that when comparing two systems, the
collaborative knowledge production model, based on multiple early
disclosures, and the conventional single-inventor, “competing with
others” model, the former presents advantages over the latter, in that
it leads to earlier and more diffused reuse.35
In a comprehensive experiment, Boudreau and Lakhani
compared the two systems focusing on the interplay between
disclosures and reuse of the knowledge disclosed.36 The first system,
referred to as “intermediate disclosure”, involves disclosures which
occur continuously, as progress is made during the problem-solving
process. Knowledge generated upstream is made available for reuse
to third parties on an ongoing basis. Its form is not standardized; it
may come in varying shapes and quanta of knowledge, including
partial and negative results, methods, data, progress etc. This system
is commonly practiced within creative collaborative communities. A
second system is a conventional single-inventor system, it is roughly
32

Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 9.
Id. at 9.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 17.
36
Id. at 4.
33
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analogous to inventive activity that might result in a patent grant.
Labeled as a “final” disclosure system, its invention is revealed only
once the inventive process is completed. It is presented in a
standardized format, as an integral and wholly resolved solution.
Reuse of the knowledge underlying the invention only occurs after
the invention is complete.37
3. Intermediate vs. final disclosure
These experiments showed that, when compared to a system
based on final disclosure, a system of intermediate disclosure yields
more frequent and wider ranging unrestricted disclosures.38 This fact
increases the immediacy and extent of knowledge transfers and
promotes more efficient reuse of the knowledge generated. A steady
stream of updates allows problem solvers to observe and respond
systematically to their own experimentation outcomes and to those of
others. This tends to result in differentiated search paths and a greater
diversity in approaches to solutions. Once the right approach is found,
contributors can converge in a coordinated fashion on the optimal
solution, demanding overall less effort and fewer costs, while yielding
higher performance
These findings reinforce and validate the openness practices of
OSS communities. An open community setting is premised on early
and repeated disclosures to many participants. It therefore leads to
widespread diffusion of knowledge. The intermediate disclosure
system accommodates a greater range and varying quanta of
knowledge. For instance, disclosures contain partial and negative
results, methods, data, progress etc.39 This fact promotes (1) a greater
diversity in the search paths of individual contributors and (2) greater
accuracy in the solution ultimately found, because downstream
researchers have access to the entire history (methods, results, etc)
and the opportunity to revise and correct.
B. Motivation
Motivation of peer-to-peer community contribution has
generated a vast amount of literature.40 Sociologists now generally
37 Id. at 4-5.
38
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 14.
39 Id. at 5.
40
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 7; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Margit Osterloh und Bruno S.
Frey, Managing Motivation: Warum das Thema heute noch brennender ist, Management
Wissen, Markus Sulzberger, Robert J. Zaugg (eds), Springer, 43-49 (2018); Lerner & Jean
Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 206 (2002)
www.jstor.org/stable/3569837.
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accept that rational self-interest does not explain a contributor’s
willingness to spend numerous hours trying to tackle a community
project, with no prospect of monetary gain.41 A wide range of social
motivations, beyond material self-interest alone, 42 play a central role
in human behavior.43
Based on these recognitions, community contributors are viewed
as being motivated by a heterogeneous blend of intrinsic and extrinsic
non-monetary motivations.44 Extrinsic motivation involves doing an
activity for some separable consequence and results from feelings
such as ego boosts or receiving recognition. It has an important
signaling effect; for instance, the open source participation
designation of “committer” is a sought-after title in the larger
community.45 Extrinsic motivation is usually externally driven and
involves an audience and scales with the size of the audience.46
Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, does not contemplate an
audience.47 It is based on individuals’ inherent satisfaction of carrying
out an activity, their enjoyment or their sense of obligation or
community. Some of the dimensions of intrinsic motivation are the
desire to be part of a team, the ability to express creativity,
experiencing satisfaction and accomplishment, altruism, identification
with a particular group, creative discovery, own use, learning-bydoing, a challenge to be overcome and a difficulty resolved.48 Both
types of motivation come into play in open communities.
This motivational structure causes the inventive community to
be socialized to collaborative rather than competitive interactions in
the course of the innovation process, which, in turn, translate into
early and liberal disclosures of knowledge.

41

See generally Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scrotchmer, Open Source Software: The New
Intellectual Property Paradigm NBER Working Paper No. 12148, 12 (2006); Li, supra note 25,
at 4; Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 5-6.
42
Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 12.
43
Benkler, supra note 5, at 3.
44
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 14; K. Boudreau, N. Lacetera & K. Lakhani "Incentives and
Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis." 57 MGMT. SCI. 843, 861
(2011).
45
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 12; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Boudreau et. al., supra note
44, at 11.
46
Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Lerner & Tirole, supra note 40, at 213-14.
47
Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 4; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Boudreau et. al, supra note 44,
at 861.
48
Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Margit Osterloh, Open Source Softwareproduktion: Ein neues
Innovationsmodell? (2004), http://www.opensourcejahrbuch.de/download/jb2004/chapter_02/II4-OserlohRotaKuster.pdf; Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 11-12.
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C. OSS today- a model for OSH?
Given its primarily non-economic motivational structure,
sustainability and scalability of the open source model have been
questioned. Some scholars have viewed the early GNU license and
movement to free source code, as an outburst of idealism, facilitated
largely by the emergence of digitally enabled interactive new ways of
communicating and collaborating.49 It has been suggested that open
source (“OS”) production is more appropriate for niche applications
and may be unable to scale sufficiently to sustain economically viable
production.50
On the other hand, following its emergence in the 1980s,51 OS
rapidly gained popularity within the software community. Industry
and scholarly literature perceived it as a new model of innovation.52
As pointed out above, Linux currently runs on more than 82% of the
world’s smart phones and the vast majority of the world’s
supercomputers.
Today’s OS is probably best characterized as multifaceted.
Diverse models have emerged, which differ in terms of whether
contributors are paid, whether the project is run hierarchically and
how it is strategically managed.53 The most commonly encountered
ones, are pure peer community production, evidenced by GNU, CC,
Arch
Linux
and
supported
by
volunteer-developers54,
heterogeneously driven projects, such as Apache and Eclipse, which
use mostly paid developers, Linux and Firefox, using some unpaid
developers centered around a project, as well as the ones driven and
49

Stephen M. Maurer, Stepping Stones: Extending the Open Source Idea to Synthetic Biology,
SYNBIO AND HUMAN HEALTH, Springer, Dordrecht, (2013), https://doiorg.libproxy.scu.edu/10.1007/978-94-017-9196-0_14.
50
See id.; Jan-Felix Schrape, Understanding Open-source Software Communities, COCREATION - RESHAPING BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF BOTTOM-UP ECONOMICS 72, 78
(M. Moritz & T. Redlich eds., Springer Verlag, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author) (However, is assertion is placed into question by the parallel development of open
movement in other areas, such as open science, open academic publishing, creative commons).
51
The OS movement was born as a reaction to a technology shift, following which companies
began treating as proprietary, source code, which had until then been freely accessible. In
th1983, Richard Stallman, the founder of OS and the “freeing software” philosophy, developed
the GNU open software license, with the aim to contractually ensure propagation of free
software and to prevent intellectual property from becoming an instrument of control by owners
against
users.
Richard
Stallman,
GNU
INITIAL
ANNOUNCEMENT,
https://www.gnu.org/gnu/initial-announcement.html; Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike:
Understanding and Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 443, 446 (2005).
52
Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 3.
53
Schrape, supra note 50, at 75-7.
54
Pearce, supra note 25, at 1.
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paid for by large corporations, such as Android,55 where contributors
are paid and make their contributions during work hours.56
In some of the commercial settings, the social motivation seems
to have somewhat eroded, because it can easily be replaced by
monetary incentive.57 It is unclear whether in commercially-based
models, the fundamental clash of values between contributors and
commercial promoter in terms of hierarchy, autonomy, appropriation
of knowledge etc., has been resolved and if so, how.
At the same time, there is little dispute that OSS knowledge
production has brought about a change of paradigm, from which
many lessons can be learned.58 OSS has taught that innovation is
primarily an emergent property of knowledge flow, brought about by
early disclosure, sharing of intellectual resources and collective
learning.59 It has taught that decomposition of tasks into small
modules attracts highly qualified contributors,60 and that, in this
manner, a project can be staffed by “the best person to produce a
specific module of a project” within a specific time frame.61 It has
further taught greater flexibility in the collaboration between all types
of market actors62 and has opened the door to moving away from
rigid organizational structures63 to create breeding grounds for further
innovation in products and infrastructure”. 64
These features will likely be incorporated in OSH, as OSS and
OSH share a knowledge production mechanism. It is further
reasonable to expect a similar variety of business models will emerge
within OSH. We will now turn to the OS license, the legal construct
55

Schrape, supra note 50, at 75.; See also Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 4-19 (As a
result of this convergence, many fail to differentiate between OS, as promoted initially by
Richard Stallman and open innovation, a proprietary collaborative creation mechanism,
advocated by Henry Chesbrough.)
56
Lakani & Wolf, supra note 5, at 9-10 (have found that 40% of contributors to OSS are paid to
participate. Lakhani communities and that 55% of the contributors make their contributions
during work hours and receive a salary.)
57
Maurer, supra note 49, at 13-14; Schrape, supra note 50, at 76.
58
Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation
to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, 22 No.6 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 1369, 1413-14
(2011), https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0618; Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux
and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369, 371-72 (2002).
59
Lemley & Shafir, supra note 6, at 141-42.
60
Benkler, supra note 5, at 237; Benkler, supra note 58, at 14.
61
Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 40, at 23.
62
Schrape, supra note 50, at 78.
63
Benker, supra note 5, at 45.
64
Recent studies have indicated that with increasing scale and market relevance of an OS
project, tends to depart from non-hierarchical, non-structured volunteer work, to a more
commercially run structure in which contributors are paid and subject to hierarchical decisionmaking. Schrape, supra note 50, at 74.
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that enables the existence of OS as a knowledge production
mechanism in the first place.
III. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF OPEN SOURCE
A. The legal basis of the open license
The open license agreement is a privately ordered, contractual
instrument with a dual role. On the one hand, it governs the
community and ensures its cohesion and collaborative, noncompeting spirit.65 On the other, it allocates IP rights and permissions
relating to the knowledge generated among contracting parties, i.e. to
the members of the community.
The OS license is based on the premise that anyone should be
able to “see the source … study it, modify it, and share it” and that
modifications are to be disclosed under the terms of the original
license.66 Its terms are meant to ensure compliance with the ethos of
openness and accessibility by downstream users, so that no portion of
a program can be appropriated.67 It ensures the free flow of
knowledge among the potentially large number of recipients which
constitutes a project’s creative community.
The flow of knowledge within the community is regulated by a
set of permissions and prohibitions surrounding the IP rights owned
by the contributors, based on the following mechanism: copyright
rights arise automatically upon creation, once a work is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.68 No action is required for these
rights to attach. Because copyright is deemed to subsist in any
computer program,69 software developers automatically own
copyright rights in any program they create. Copyright owners thus
have the right to exclude others from copyright protected acts,
including reproduction, modification and distribution.70 This right to
exclude may be contracted away, for instance, by permitting to third
parties to access the code, in exchange for the promise that the third
party will reciprocate.
Combined, these permissions granted by each developer, form a
system of mutual cross-licenses, in which developer-contributors
agree to license all their rights in the source code of their product to
65

Greenbaum, supra note 23, at 259.
The Four Essential Freedoms of Free Software, GNU, https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/freesw.html#f1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
67
Ackermann, supra note 17, at 195.
68
17 U.S.C. §101 (2010).
69
17 U.S.C. §101 (2010).
70
17 U.S.C. §106 (2010).
66
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any other compliant member of the community (licensee). This makes
each licensee the recipient of the other parties’ (licensors’) license
grant, and obligates it, in turn, to grant the same rights to others. Two
principal obligations are involved: contributors are required to license
under the terms governing the original license (1) the source code it
develops and (2) the source code to any modifications to existing
code.
This structure ensures that both code and modifications are
disclosed and passed on to successive downstream licensees. These
licensees are entitled to use, extract, reuse, modify and distribute the
licensed program to third parties. The owner/licensor also agrees,
explicitly or implicitly, not to enforce its rights, as long as the
licensee complies with the license terms. In this way, the values of
keeping the software free, both in the monetary and the accessibility
sense, as well as unrestricted sharing, non-appropriability, attribution,
etc. are hard-wired into the agreement. Looping back to the earlier
discussion,71 the open license in effect implements the ingredients of
the intermediate disclosure policy outlined by Boudreau and Lakhani:
ongoing early disclosures that lead to widespread reuse.72
The original open source license limits use of open source code
to non-commercial entities, in what is, referred to as a “copyleft” (or
share-alike) feature.73 Contributors are required to license any
modifications under the terms of the original license, with the effect
that all code subject to a copyleft license, which calls for noncommercial use, must remain non-commercial throughout its
downstream use. Because the copyleft license was perceived as too
restrictive for certain uses, “permissive” licenses emerged, which
allow for downstream commercial use of the licensed material.74
In addition to regulating the flow of knowledge in the spirit of
openness, open licenses have collateral benefits in that, by their very
structure, they increase of participants and diffuse technology. The
fact that OSS communities use variants of a pre-existing standardized
license terms additionally increases the efficiency of knowledge
diffusion. The license offers a convenient and reliable way of
transferring knowledge downstream. It will be used by many
downstream contributors, because they are familiar with its terms.
71

See above discussion early disclosure.
Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 14.
73
GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2018).
74
See e.g. BSD LICENSE, https://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause (last visited Nov. 3,
2018); APACHE LICENSE, https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 (last visited Nov. 3,
2018)
72
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This leads to participation of individuals who cannot be identified in
advance. The non-proprietary structure of the knowledge flow gives
rise to a non-competitive environment, in which developers feel free
to share code and an early stage, without fear of appropriation by a
third party.75
B. Enforceability of open licenses
For many years following the adoption of the open source
license, its enforceability was in doubt. Questions were raised, among
other things, as to lack of consideration and whether OS licenses are
enforceable under contract or under IP law. The dearth of early court
decisions on this issue is attributable, in part, to the nature of
enforceable rights enforced. OS licenses involve terms that keep IP
rights diffused, rather than exclusionary and therefore, in most such
instances, no substantial economic value is at stake.76 Nonetheless,
because open license terms constitute the glue that holds together
countless software transactions and binds millions of OSS
contributors, judicial validation of this license structure is important.
In Jacobson v. Katzer,77 the Federal Circuit removed some of the
doubts surrounding OS license enforceability. The court confirmed
that IP rights granted as part of an artistic open license are assertible,
in holding that the defendant’s unauthorized copying of certain
textual files, owned by the plaintiff, violated a license condition,
rather than a covenant.78 The legal effect of violating a condition, as
opposed to a covenant, is to render the license ineffective, thus
leaving the unlicensed use of copyrighted material open to an
infringement action.79 An OS license can therefore form an
enforceable contractual relationship. This fact was more recently
confirmed in Artifex Software v. Hancom, where a California District
Court refused to dismiss a plaintiff’s contract claim in connection
75

Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 14; Ackermann, supra, note 17, at 195.
OSS licenses are seldom asserted in courts. One reason for this is that enforcement would be
in the direction of “openness”, i.e. it would enforce terms meant to keep knowledge and IP
rights diffused among the members of the community, rather than concentrated in one or a small
number of owners, as a conventional IP license would. Therefore, in most instances, no
substantial economic value is at stake in open licenses and there is little incentive to sue
(although this must be qualified in light of statutory copyright damages which may be imposed
regardless of the amount in dispute. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)).
77
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
78
Id.
79
The scope of this holding remains in dispute. Some believe its significance may be limited
contract construction, which would vary from state to state. Hersh R. Reddy, Jacobsen v.
Katzer: The Federal Circuit Weighs in on the Enforceability of Free and Open Source Software
Licenses, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 299, 310 (2009).
76

40

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

with a GNU license.80 Similar decisions have been issued in other
jurisdictions.81
Certain tension points are expected to continue causing disputes
in OSS licenses. These include the failure to attribute, as well as
unauthorized incorporation in proprietary products of the material
licensed under a copyleft license, such as GPL. A possible outcome
would be that such acts constitute a breach of the license agreement
and would entitle the creator to bring a claim for copyright
infringement. Breach of a contractual clause might void the effect of
the license, resulting in a finding of infringement against the
breaching party. Remedies could consist of damages or an injunction,
requiring the infringer to cease use of the licensed material.
The discussion, so far, has concentrated on general principles of
open licenses, illustrated primarily by OSS licenses. We will now
focus on the specifics of OSH licenses and how they differ from OSS
licenses.
C. The Open Hardware license
OSH licenses have been adapted from the OSS license to fit the
needs of hardware design. They are built on the same structural and
ideological principles and have largely the same features as OSS
licenses. Some of the better-known licenses are the TAPR Open
Hardware License82 and the CERN Open Hardware license.83
The fundamental difference, compared to OSS, is the relation to
copyright. The OSS license works well, because copyright arises
automatically upon creation. It constitutes a license obligation trigger
or “hook” with respect to any copyrightable materials created within
the community. Source code, the product of OSS innovation, is
presumptively copyrightable and gives its the owner the power to
contract.
This mechanism does not necessarily work for the OSH license.
The output of the OSH process consists of (1) documentation,
instructing the user how to build the hardware product and (2) the
hardware product itself. The documentation follows the principles of
the OSS license, because most of its components, such as text,

80

Artifex Software, Inc. v. Hancom, Inc., No. 16-cv-06982-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62815,
at *18 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2017 and September 12, 2017) (The matter was settled out of court
in December 2017.)
81
E.g. Welte v. Sitecom Deutschland GmbH, case nr. 21 O 6123/04, Munich District Court
(May 19, 2005).
82
THE TAPR OPEN HARDWARE LICENSE, www.tapr.org/ohl.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
83
CERN OHL VERSION 1.2, www.ohwr.org/documents/294 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
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drawings and code, are presumptively copyrightable. They can
operate as a license hook much in the same manner as source code
does and trigger copyright enforcement. However, when it comes to
the physical hardware product, there are serious doubts as to whether
it can be subject to copyright, and therefore as to its reliability as a
trigger.
For this reason, the OSH license grants rights to the two outputs
of the innovative process (1) the Documentation and (2) the Product,
the physical hardware output created based on the Documentation.84
The following will give an overview over each of these provisions in
turn.
1. Rights in the “Documentation” as trigger of license
obligations
The primary trigger of license obligations under the OSH license
is the Documentation. It contains all the information necessary to
construct the physical output and may include schematic diagrams,
designs, circuit or circuit board layouts, mechanical drawings, flow
charts and descriptive text, and other explanatory material.85
a. Copyright
These items may fall into protected categories of “works” under
copyright laws. It can be assumed that text and code are protectable as
“literary works” in the US, as well as in most members of the Berne
Convention;86 schematics of circuits, engineering and technical
drawings, as well as CAD and STS files may qualify for copyright
protection; in the US as “pictorial, graphic and sculptural” works;87 a
video would be protected as audio-visual work.88 The various
components of the Documentation would be entitled to protection, as
long as they display a modicum of creativity.89 Once these
requirements are met, they are presumptively sufficient to trigger
copyright rights to the documentation for purposes of the OSH
license.90 A contributor/licensor would thus acquire exclusive rights
84

Ackermann, supra note 17, at 192.
CERN OPEN HARDWARE LICENSE, https://www.ohwr.org/projects/cernohl/documents (last
visited Nov. 3, 2018).
86
Oracle America v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
87
Bechtold, supra note 22, at 14.
88
It should be noted that these are assumptions as to protectability, which have not been tested
in court
89
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991).
90
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. MJG-06-2662, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112846
(D. Md. Sept. 30, 2011).
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of reproduction, modification and distribution of the Documentation,
which can be contracted.
A wrinkle appears when the Documentation is used to make the
hardware product, but the user does not actually engage in one of the
acts prohibited by copyright law. For instance, if a user were to
merely “use” the documentation to construct a product, but not
engage in an act prohibited by copyright, such as reproduction,
modification or distribution, copyright law would not be infringed.91
A user who makes the product based on reading the documentation,
would therefore escape liability because (a) no act infringing
copyright in the documentation can be shown, and (b) there generally
is no copyright in a three dimensional utilitarian product. This
constitutes a gap in the OSH license’s enforceability (unless the
contributor had separately secured patent protection).
While the manufacture of a physical object by traditional means
probably does not infringe copyright, it has been suggested that
manufacture by way of a 3D printing process does.92 The argument is
based on the use of CAD and STL design files during the 3D printing
process. To 3D print a design file, a user would have to copy the files
into the memory of the 3D printer. Throughout the printing process
these files are transformed into a series of print-ready twodimensional slices. A user thus engages in two acts prohibited by
copyright, reproduction and modification (making a derivative work).
This would trigger the copyright protection required for the license to
be enforceable.93
b. Patent
Some portion of the Documentation, such as circuits or circuit
board layouts may be patentable, if they fulfill the requirements of
being new, useful and non-obvious94 and do not consist of merely
abstract ideas.95 Patents are not common in the open hardware
environment, possibly because procuring patent protection is
relatively time consuming and costly, but also because appropriating
knowledge in the form of exclusive IP rights is contrary to the ethos
of open hardware.96 Still, in some cases, patents may be the only
91

Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Greenbaum, supra note 23, at 275-76.
93
Id. at 276-77.
94
35 USC §§101, 103.
95
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank. Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
96
Jason Schultz & Jennifer Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License
as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 1, 10 et. seq. (2012).
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contractable IP right by which the OSH can trigger license obligations
with respect to a particular product. Unlike copyright, patent rights do
not arise upon creation, and consequently, cannot automatically
trigger license obligations. Nonetheless, if procured, they can serve as
trigger and, to this end, some of the OSH licenses have been modified
to accommodate patent rights.97 Once obtained, the patent rights are
licensed under the open license and subject to the same license
obligations as exclusive rights under copyright law. The patent owner
grants to all community members the right to practice the invention,
or, alternatively, a personal immunity from suit relating to the
patent(s).98 Furthermore, licensees must license any improvements
under the terms of the original license.99 In other words, the OSH
licensed patent does not primarily play an exclusionary role, but
rather an inclusive one, by creating a permissive zone around the
documentation and the physical product, in which users are free from
infringement liability to the patentee, but not from infringement
claims brought by third parties.
Under certain circumstances, however, the documentation may
operate as a “defensive patent publication” and even insulate from
infringement actions by third parties.100 This is because a sufficiently
widespread publication of an invention may destroy its novelty and
render the invention unpatentable to others, by placing it into the
public domain.101 This eliminates the risk of possible future
infringement actions. In some industries it is common practice to
publish “defensively”, in order to maintain patent-free space.102
An effective defensive publication must function as an
“enabling” description, in other words, it must describe the invention
in sufficient detail to allow others skilled in the respective art, to
practice it and make the product. To be effective, a defensive
publication must further include a description of the idea of the

97

TAPR Open Hardware License v1.0, TAPR (May 25 2007),
www.tapr.org/TAPR_Open_Hardware_License_v1.0.txt; CERN Open Hardware License v.1.1,
CERN (Jul. 13, 2011), https://ohwr-production.s3-eu-west1.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/file/662/CERNOHLv1_1.pdf?X-Amz-Expires=600&XAmz-Date=20181024T191705Z&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-AmzCredential=AKIAJDWHW5JNHWMBZXXQ/20181024/eu-west-1/s3/aws4_request&X-AmzSignedHeaders=host&X-AmzSignature=262a152882657248aa40c06f7801245c0af47439c7db824c081d65c044e76135.
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Ackerman, supra note 17, at 194.
99
See, e.g., TAPR license, supra note 97, section 2.2.
100
Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 157-63.
101
35 U.S.C. §102(b) (2011).
102
DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS, www.defensivepublications.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
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invention, its function, the flow of data, as well as applicable
drawings or figures.103
OSH Documentation can operate much like a defensive
publication: it is designed to record in detail every iteration, trial and
error, partial solutions and final solution in the development of the
product. Its purpose is to instruct downstream users on how to
produce the invention, with sufficient specificity to allow a person
skilled in the field to make the product. If published in a manner
accessible by the public, OSH documentation may well meet the
requirements of a defensive publication with respect to the product or
project at issue. In this role, use of the Documentation achieves the
open hardware’s goal by a different path: it diffuses knowledge, not
by binding licensees to openness, but by placing the invention in the
public domain.
Finally, patent protection may serve its traditional exclusionary
function and prevent non-licensees from practicing the invention.
Even if a patent owner-licensor has issued non-exclusive licenses to
several licensees, it would typically still be entitled to prevent an
unauthorized user of the invention from practicing it. Depending on
the circumstances, sufficient exclusionary value may be left in the
patent in order to allow its owner to extract economic value from it.
This avenue is, of course, foreclosed in the event the Documentation
has been used as a defensive publication.
2. Rights in the “Product” as trigger of license
obligations
The OSH license also grants rights to the “Product”. Product in
this context is the physical output of the OSH innovation process, in
the form of an electronic, a 3d printed or any other physical object,
that is generated through the OSH process based on the
Documentation.104 Products are best protected by patent. Copyright
applies only qualifiedly.
a. Copyright
Copyright protection for physical three-dimensional objects is
generally limited to products which are artistic in nature. Utilitarian
products are not copyright protectable for the following reasons.
For purposes of copyright protection, three-dimensional works
are evaluated under the standards of the “pictorial, graphic,
103
104

Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 158.
See supra Section 4.3.1.
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sculptural” works doctrine.105 Under this doctrine, a “useful article”,
i.e. an article with an intrinsic utilitarian function is not copyright
protectable. In cases in which a product displays both utilitarian and
artistic features, it must be determined whether the article’s aesthetic
features can be identified and can exist separately from its utilitarian
aspects.106 To that end, a court would look first, whether the artistic
features can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art
separate from the useful article, and second, whether, if it were
imagined separately from the useful article into which it is
incorporated, it would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible
medium of expression.107 This standard is difficult to meet and most
utilitarian products would probably fail. However, OSH developed
artistic objects, such as sculptures manufactured by means of the 3D
printing process, would stand a better chance of meeting the “useful
article” test.108
Absence of copyright protection for utilitarian OSH products
means that an inventor cannot bind downstream licensees by a right
that arises automatically. The OSH license may therefore not be
enforceable when it comes to utilitarian Products, to the extent it
relies solely on copyright. This fact does not necessarily have serious
ramifications: as long as the OSH license also conveys rights in
copyrightable, the can, as described in detail above, act as a license
trigger. In the alternative, patent protection would ensure that the
OSH license remains enforceable as far as the Product grant is
concerned.
b. Patent
Patent law is the proper IP instrument to protect utilitarian OSH
Products. How it applies to physical products, is largely the same as
described under Documentation above. 109
3. Know-How and latent knowledge
Know-how is not expressly mentioned in the license agreement;
however, it is omnipresent in the process of community innovation
and deserves separate discussion. As used for present purposes, it is
the combined, cumulative knowledge on how to develop and
105

17 U.S.C. §101.
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).
107
Id. at 1011.
108
17 U.S.C. §101; See generally Star Athelica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1008-10.
109
See supra section 4.3.1.b Patent.
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manufacture a physical product, generated in the course of a given
OSH invention, regardless of any IP rights which may apply.
Most of this know-how refers to the invention process of trial
and error, partial results, tentative solutions, final solutions, etc. and is
captured by the Documentation. That part is available for immediate
reuse by community members. Separately, in the context of
community innovation, most often an additional type of know-how
exists, which will be referred to as latent know-how. 110 Latent knowhow is not contained in the Documentation. This is so, because the
Documentation primarily records the result of relatively linear
thinking in pursuit of a solution to a given problem. Information that
appears to be of lesser relevance to the immediate innovation
outcome, such as general knowledge, alternative paths that have been
discarded, collateral observations, etc. may not be reflected in the
Documentation. Latent know-how is akin to “sticky” knowledge,
described by Eric von Hippel,111 in that its transfer out of the
community would be difficult or even impossible and come at a high
cost. However, latent knowledge exists within the community and is
low hanging fruit, easily accessible if the problem is posed slightly
differently, say, in the course of improving the original solution.112
As will be discussed below, whether or not it can be tapped into
successfully is a function of the relationship between the inventive
community and the implementer.113
This concludes the discussion on the flow of knowledge
associated with the OSH inventive process and its fixation into
contractual obligations that govern the inventive community. Next,
we will examine the ability to capture economic value in the context
of an OSH invention, in which knowledge is widely diffused.
IV. CAPTURING VALUE FROM CONSTRUCTING A TANGIBLE
PRODUCT
It is commonly accepted that control over its IP rights is required
for capturing economic value from an invention. The ability to
110

Formalized knowledge is knowledge that is captured in the Documentation or other means in
which it is easily transmissible to third parties. Latent knowledge is knowledge which has not
been formally captured, but it is knowledge that was a part of the inventor’s mental process
during the inventive process, e.g. trial and error, alternative search paths, discarded experiments,
etc.
111
Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for
Innovation, MGMT. SCI. 429, 429 (Apr. 1994) https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.4.429.
112
This latent know-how may be suggested by or hinted at in the Documentation, but it may be
a completely new approach triggered by the altered question.
113
See infra section 5.4.

2018]

FROM BITS TO ATOMS

47

capture value operates to attract investment.114 Both OSS and OSH
present a challenge in this regard, as knowledge is diffused and
exclusively appropriable IP rights are unavailable. Compared to OSS,
OSH however, faces higher hurdles, because greater financial
resources are required to produce and commercialize physical
products.
A. Atoms vs. bits - the tangible nature of OSH
The core difference between a OSS and a OSH product is that
the OSS product is digital, i.e. consists of bits, while the OSH product
is tangible and consists of atoms. 115 The processes required to ready
software for final use are all digital, because software is selfexecuting, in that the necessary instructions are incorporated in the
program itself and carried out automatically. On the other hand, a
tangible OSH product requires multiple operations such as testing,
prototyping, marketing, permitting, manufacturing, storage, shipping
and distribution before getting to the end-user. In addition, component
parts and raw material must be purchased and physical manufacturing
space must be secured.116 All these tasks involved are labor- and
capital-intensive. How can an individual inventor or an OSH
inventive community fund all these operations?
B. Inventor commercialization
The most approachable way to meet the financial obligations of
production, and at the same time to preserve the open community
ethos, is for an OSH inventor is to self-finance, rely on donations or
grants, or find a business model which, at a minimum, covers costs.
The simplest model is for the inventor to self-fund the manufacture
and sale of product in the market. A leading example is Aleph
Objects,117 which sells the OSS and OSH Lulzbot 3D printer, used to
make scientific tools such as tube racks, centrifuges and microscope
accessories.118 An alternative approach is to license the technology
114
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under an open source license, while securing trademark protection for
any products sold, entitling the inventor to royalties for third party
sales. This model is being used successfully by the Arduino OSH
ecosystem.119 In addition to its platform, which is made available on
an open source basis, Arduino offers consulting services relating to its
technologies. Funding can also be secured from non-profit
organizations or through crowdsourcing. For instance, with the help
of funding from a foundation, Open Source Ecology (OSE) is
developing open source blueprints of a set of “the 50 most important
machines that it takes for modern life to exist – everything from a
tractor, to an oven, to a circuit maker.”120 The blueprints are
published on an open platform and freely accessible to any interested
user, OSE also runs paid-for workshops.121
In the instances cited above, the IP rights are diffused in that the
designs underlying the product are publicly available. The inventors’
strategy in these instances is to out-innovate possible competition, by
relying on the ongoing stream of low cost research and development
that flows from the innovative community. In conjunction with their
communities, these inventors have developed a high degree of latent
expertise and knowledge, which allows them to readily come up with
solutions for improvements, further development and new
applications. Reliance on the same inventive community on an
ongoing basis brings with it the competitive advantages of easily
tapping into latent knowledge and of conveying a certain guarantee of
quality of the product.122 These benefits are unavailable to outsiders,
even though they may have access to the designs.123
Absent relatively substantial investment, likely from a for-profit
actor, the inventor commercialization model has limitations in that it
is hard to scale. At this point, pure OSH companies operate mostly as
niche providers.124

119

ARDUINO, www.arduino.cc (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY, https://www.opensourceecology.org/ (last visited Nov. 3,
2018).
121
OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY,
http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/Why_OSE_Doesn%27t_Support_the_Use_of_Creative_Com
mons_Non-Commercial_Licenses (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
122
E.g. ARDUINO, www.arduino.cc (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
123
Lars Zimmermann, The Open Source Hardware and Open Design Business Models Matrix,
BUILDING OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE, (Alicia Gibb, ed., 2015).
124
An exception to this is Red Hat, which operates based on a model in which paid-for services
are provided on top of the original open source program. RED HAT, www.redhat.com (last
visited Nov. 3, 2018).
120

2018]

FROM BITS TO ATOMS

49

C. IP prerequisites for commercially based exploitation
The need to scale the operations surrounding an OSS/OSH
product raises the question of securing investment, and, in turn, of the
economic incentive to invest into an OSH invention. A commerciallyoriented firm would expect to receive a quantum of IP rights that give
the firm exclusivity or at least a sufficient degree of control, to place
it in favorable position in the market. Such rights would take the form
of a license “package” that grant the licensee exclusive rights, or at
least control over the relevant IP rights, for the maximum possible
duration. In addition, an investor-licensee would receive safeguards
of enforceability, such a clear description of the contracting parties, a
listing of the rights transferred, comprehensive definition of the
product licensed and of the rights granted, e.g. control of rights to
manufacture, use, sell, replicate, etc. the physical product, including
any software, know-how, drawings, documentation, as well as
exclusivity in specified markets, as well as various warranties and
indemnities, termination provisions, etc.
This quantum and structure of rights is not available in a
community innovation setting because the logic underlying
community innovation value creation by early and frequent
disclosures. By way of the rights anchored in the OSH license, OSH
promotes diffusion, rather than concentration of knowledge and
allows value to be captured by the community, rather by a single
economic actor.125 This structure not only allows free use by the
community but encourages third-party users of the technology to
enter the market.126
In short, a community invention setting does not generate
appropriable IP rights which could place an investor in a favorable
competitive position.127 Rational economic actors would therefore
have little incentive to invest in the commercial exploitation of a pure
open source invention.128
D. Capturing value in the absence of IP rights
Because, as described above, pure community inventions tend
not to attract investment from commercially oriented firms, various
hybrid models of exploitation have emerged. They range from pure
125
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peer community projects, driven by volunteers, to corporate-led
projects and often are combinations of the two.129 These models
bundle OSH inventions with IP-based ones:130 one may function as
the primary profit center, while the other may serve as add-on or
complementary products. 131 For instance, if a proprietary cell phone
uses an open source application or operating system, the value of the
proprietary phone would be enhanced by the free nature of the open
technology. 132 In effect then, even though the community invention’s
IP rights are diffused, the invention can add to the overall ability to
make a profit.133
Hybrid models combine two heterogeneous systems: one
property-based, the other is community-based. These systems diverge
in ethos and values. As will be explained below, tensions may arise
from this. careful management of the boundary between systems is
mandated.134
E. Ongoing collaboration with the community as primary
source of innovation – clash of values
In a hybrid business model, that combines community
innovation with commercial implementation, the source of innovation
generally continues to be the community. Activities such as testing,
prototyping, manufacturing, but importantly, also product
improvements and further development, typically draw on the
community innovation, and require an ongoing exchange of
information between implementer and community.135
However, the values of the two groups are misaligned.136 A
commercial firm seeks to appropriate formal IP rights in order to
extract economic value from the invention. Open communities have
typically opted out of formal IP and adhere to a regime of sharing and
open disclosure of knowledge. This ideological misalignment may
give rise to tension in different ways.
129
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One source of tension is the difference in organizational
structures. An open community usually consists of volunteers and
functions in a non-hierarchical, non-structured manner. Community
contributors act as autonomous, spontaneous problem-solvers, at a
time and in a space determined by them. A hybrid model, on the other
hand, tends to push for a commercially run structure, subject to
hierarchical decision-making. It favors paid contributors.137 With
increasing scale and market relevance of a project, the pressure to
impose more orchestrated goals and specific deadlines and operate in
a strictly commercial manner also increases.138
Further tension flows from differing expectations regarding the
transfer of knowledge. A commercial firm generally expects an
invention to be handed over in a complete package, which contains
substantially all the information required for productization, as would
be the case with a patent. However, innovation is an iterative process,
characterized by uncertainty, in an environment of successive trial
and error experiments. In an open community setting, innovation is
the result of ongoing communications among members of the
community, queries, updates, receipt of observations and feedback,
solutions found, discarded, modified, readopted and improved.139 The
innovation is therefore contained in sequential, iterative and often
messy disclosures. Furthermore, certain latent or “sticky” knowledge
remains within the community. 140 Its transfer away from the
community comes at the cost of maintaining a smooth collaborative
relationship141 requires sensitive management of the community
relationship.
Finally, allocation of benefits of the creative output between
community and implementer may be a source of discontent. If
community members’ perceive that the commercial operator receives
disparate profits, their motivation may be undermined.142
In short, the ideological misalignment between the two systems
risks destabilizing their collaboration.143 If community members drop
out for lack of motivation or because they question the integrity and
values of the community, its internal governance regime is threatened.
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A real possibility exists that the community may collapse,144 as
contributors have alternate ways of spending their time and talent. For
the implementer, on the other hand, severing the interaction with the
community would come at a high cost, in that it would deprive the
commercial actor of its source of innovation.145 All of this, presents a
strategic challenge for both groups. Mutual finesse is required in
order not to alienate the other group.146
CONCLUSION
The success of collaborative, community open innovation has
been evidenced primarily in the context of open source software
(OSS), i.e. the realm of intangible, digital products (bits). This paper
asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an environment
involving three-dimensional tangible products (atoms), or open
hardware (OSH). To this end, we have examined OSS and OSH from
several perspectives.
The first aspect considered was the open community innovation
mechanism, common to both OSS and OSH. Both follow an
intermediate disclosure system, which involves early and repeated
disclosures of the knowledge that underlies the innovation. This fact
leads to its wide diffusion and frequent downstream reuse giving rise
to an overall enhanced innovation power. However, we also noted
that widespread diffusion of the knowledge underlying the innovation
is in tension with the appropriability of IP and the need for
investment.
The second aspect considered, was the structure of the open
license. Certain differences exist between OSS and OSH licenses,
necessitated by the tangible nature of the hardware product. The OSS
license is based on the fact that copyright arises automatically upon
creation. Every software developer thus owns a contractable IP right.
Combined these rights underlie the OSS license. OSH products,
which are tangible, are not necessarily subject to copyright law, a fact
which raises a question as to the enforceability of the OSH structure.
However, it is likely that this problem has been addressed by the fact
that the OSH grants a license in the “Documentation”, most of whose
components are likely subject to copyright.
Third, we looked at what steps are necessary for each final
product to reach its end-user. Software is self-executing, in that all
instructions for implementation are incorporated into the product and
144
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executed digitally. Consequently, its implementation entails relatively
low costs. Hardware, on the other hand, requires labor and costintensive operations associated with manufacture, distribution, etc.,
which require investment. Commercial firms are generally motivated
to invest by the availability of appropriable IP rights. No such rights
are available under the open source license because its effect is to
diffuse, rather than concentrate rights for purposes of appropriation.
This suggests that the tangible nature of a product makes it more
difficult to realize the full social value of a community invention.
Does this fact however negate the ability to implement open larger
scale community projects in the hardware space altogether? In the
OSS field certain hybrid business models have evolved, which make
successful commercial exploitation at a larger scale possible. These
models combine complementary IP-based products with community
innovation. In this manner, the non-appropriability of the community
innovation tends not to detract from the ability to monetize the
combined product. A scalable hybrid model in the hardware context
can therefore not be ruled out.
Finally, the inventive community is the continuing source of
innovation and value. This fact entails two aspects. A large quantum
of latent or “sticky” knowledge resides in the community, which can
be tapped by the implementer for purposes of improvements and
further innovation. In order to take advantage of this resource, a
sustainable relationship with the community is necessary. This
relationship may be difficult given the clash of ideology between
open community values and the goals of commercially-oriented
implementers. Managerial finesse and people skills are required to
manage this relationship.
To sum up, this article concludes that the innovative power of
OSS (bits) can be replicated in an environment involving threedimensional tangible products (atoms). Even though OSH products
face considerably greater hurdles to overcome compared to OSS
products, in a hybrid business community – commercial business
model, economic value can be captured from OSH inventions.

